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controls. The package also foresees new entities and
documents: Border Control Posts (hereinafter, BCPs)
will replace the different entities currently tasked
with border control duties. It is proposed to establish
common requirements for BCPs with the possibility
for the Commission to further refine such require-
ments to take account of specific features related to
the different categories of animals and goods being
controlled. Harmonised rules for the designation,
listing, withdrawal and suspension of BCPs will also
be laid down. A new Common Health Entry Docu-
ment (hereinafter, CHED) has been proposed to be
used by operators for the mandatory prior notifica-
tion of arrival of consignments of animals and goods
and by competent authorities to record controls on
such consignments and any decisions taken. Under
the proposed regime, the Commission will be em-
powered to establish the format of the CHED, the
modalities for its use, and theminimumtime require-
ments for the prior notification of consignments to
BCPs.
Finally, the Commission proposes to upgrade the
system dedicated to recording and tracing official
control results, the Trade Control and Expert System
(TRACES), established by Commission Decision
2003/24/EC of 30 December 2002 concerning the de-
velopment of an integrated computerised veterinary
system⁷and currently used for the management of
data and information on animals and products of an-
imal origin and official controls thereon, so as to al-
low its use for all goods for which EU agri-food chain
legislation establishes specific requirements or offi-
cial control modalities.
V. Conclusions
With the adoption of the package of measures on an-
imal and plant health, seeds and official controls in
these sectors, the Commission has initiated the leg-
islative procedure. The package of measures still
needs to be adopted by the Council and the European
Parliament. TheCommission estimates that thepack-
agewill enter into force in 2016. The reformwill have
a great impact on the import of food, commodities,
seeds and plants into the EU. Issues like the use of
veterinary medicines and plant protection products
and their residues are also concerned by the reform.
It is early to predict whether certain elements of the
reform, such as, for example, the proposed BCPs and
the CHED in relation to imports from third countries
and the upgrading of the TRACES system, will con-
tribute to a system of controls that works smoothly
and does not result in new requirements, formalities
and controls which, in the worst case, establish san-
itary and phytosanitary barriers or technical barriers
to trade into the EU.
Lifestyle Risks
This sectiondiscusses the regulationof “lifestyle risks”,
a term that can apply to both substances and behav-
iours. Lifestyle risks take place along the line of “ab-
stinence – consumption – abuse – addiction”. This can
concern substances such as food, alcohol or drugs, as
well as behaviours such as gambling or sports. The
section also addresses the question of the appropri-
ate point of equilibrium between free choice and state
intervention (regulation), as well as the question of
when risks can be considered to be acceptable or tol-
erable.
In line with the interdisciplinary scope of the journal,
the section aims at updating readers on both the reg-
ulatory and the scientifi c developments in the fi eld.
It analyses legislative initiatives and judicial deci-
sions and at the same time it provides insight into re-
cent empirical studies on lifestyle risks.
Under the influence? The Alcohol
Industry’s Involvement in the
Implementation of Advertising Bans
Oliver Bartlett*
On 1 March 2013 an independent report called
“Health First”was published calling for, amongst oth-
er things, a total ban on alcohol advertising in the
UK. This article seeks to evaluate the major hurdles
that would stand in the way of the UK, and indeed
the EU itself, pursuing such a prohibition. It argues
that the involvement of the alcohol industry is the
main roadblock preventing the enactment of a radi-
cal but much needed policy. It advocates disassocia-
tion with the alcohol industry and a willingness on
the part of EU policy makers to fight any challenges
7 OJ 2003 L 8/44.
* Durham Law School. The author would like to thank the anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments. He would like to
also offer grateful thanks to Prof. Amandine Garde (Liverpool Law
School) for her support and valuable comments on drafts of this
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that the industry raise in opposition to strong alco-
hol advertising regulation.
I. Introduction
On 1 March 2013 an independent group of experts,
supported by over 70 public health organisations, re-
leased a report entitled Health First: An evidence-
basedalcohol strategy for theUK,¹whichdetailed rec-
ommendations for a more stringent set of alcohol
control policies for the UK.
One of the key recommendations put forward by
the report was a complete ban on all alcohol adver-
tising and sponsorship,² a policy that would be a rad-
ical development in terms of the UK’s current ap-
proach to controlling alcohol advertising. Some
states in Europe already have a total ban on alcohol
advertising, and further afield more are steadily be-
ing enacted, such as the prohibition in Russia, in
force fromJanuary2013. It is against thisbackground
that this contribution reflects on what might stand
in the way of implementing such a ban in countries
such as the UK that currently have less stringent al-
cohol advertising rules, and also at EU level where
alcohol advertising is given a similarly soft treat-
ment.
Such a step is certainly desirable – according to
WHO figures, alcohol-related causes accounted for
11.8 per cent of all deaths for the age group 15 to 64
years in the EU in 2004.³ Excessive alcohol consump-
tion is also the primary cause for many non-commu-
nicablediseases, for example causingbetween75and
80 per cent of liver cirrhosis in the EU.⁴ Although it
is not necessarily the case that an increase in the gen-
eral level of alcohol consumption will relate to an in-
crease in the level of alcohol related harm experi-
enced by a population, studies exist which conclude
that ‘both average volume of alcohol consumption
and patterns of drinking have been shown to influ-
ence alcohol-related burden of disease’.⁵Thus, any in-
crease in consumption must at least be seen as like-
ly to contribute to an increased level of excessive con-
sumption.
The evidence base suggests strong links between
alcohol advertising and higher consumption rates.
Numerous reviews and studies have reported find-
ings that show exposure to alcohol advertising to be
related to increased consumption,⁶ with the Science
Group of the European Alcohol and Health Forum
concluding inanOpinion in2009 in relation toyoung
people as a particularly vulnerable group that there
was “consistent evidence to demonstrate an impact
of alcohol advertising on the uptake of drinking
among non-drinking young people, and increased
consumption among their drinking peers”.⁷
A total ban could therefore contribute significant-
ly to lowering drinking rates in Europe, and would
certainly be progress on the largely inadequate Arti-
cles 9(1)(e) and 22 of the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive,⁸which remain the EU’s only attempt to di-
rectly regulate alcohol advertising.⁹This report seeks
to highlight however that the regulatory process for
alcohol control cedes much influence to the produc-
ers of alcoholic beverages themselves, and that un-
fortunately this constitutes amajor problem formak-
ing such improvements a reality.
The report will advance this argument in two
parts: the reasons why industry involvement in alco-
hol control policy leads to difficulties will first be
analysed, followed by a discussion of what policy
makers need to take into consideration if they are to
overcome these obstacles. It will conclude that if ei-
1 Health First: an evidence based alcohol strategy for the UK (The
University of Stirling 2013) www.stir.ac.uk/manage-
ment/about/social-marketing (last accessed on 18 March 2012).
2 Ibid., at p. 26.
3 Peter Anderson, Lars Møller and Gauden Galea (eds), Alcohol in
the European Union: consumption, harm and policy approaches
(Copenhagen: World Health organisation Regional Office for
Europe, 2012), at p. 17.
4 Ibid, at p. 20.
5 Jürgen Rehm, Robin Room, Kathryn Graham et al., “The relation-
ship of average volume of alcohol consumption and patterns of
drinking to burden of disease: an overview”, 98 Addiction (2003),
pp. 1209 et sqq, at p. 1222.
6 Lesley Smith and David Foxcroft, “The effect of alcohol advertis-
ing, marketing and portrayal on drinking behaviour in young
people: systematic review of prospective cohort studies”, 9
B.M.C. Public Health (2009), pp. 51 et sqq; Petra Meier, “Inde-
pendent review of the effects of Alcohol pricing and promotion:
Part A: Systematic Reviews” (2008) available online at
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalas-
sets/documents/digitalasset/dh_091383.pdf>(last accessed on 6
August 2013); Matthis Morgenstern et al., “Exposure to alcohol
advertising and teen drinking”, 52 Preventative Medicine (2011),
pp. 146 et sqq.
7 Science Group of the European Alcohol and Health Forum,
“Does marketing communication impact on the volume and
patterns of consumption of alcoholic beverages, especially by
young people? – a review of longitudinal studies” (2009) avail-
able on the internet at <http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determi-
nants/life_style/alcohol/Forum/docs/science_o01_en.pdf> (last ac-
cessed 6 August 2013).
8 Council and Parliament Directive 2010/13/EU on Audiovisual
Media Services, OJ 2010 L 95/1
9 For more detail on the criticisms of Articles 9(1)(e) and 22, see the
analysis in: Oliver Bartlett and Amandine Garde, “Time to seize
the (red) bull by the horns: the EU’s failure to protect children























































































































ther the UK or the EU does wish to seriously consid-
er a total ban on alcohol advertising, EU and nation-
al alcohol policy makers must stop affording the in-
dustry the level of influence on policy making that
it is currently allowed to exert.
II. Why implementing a total ban is
made extremely difficult by industry’s
undue influence in policy making
This section argues that at both national and EU lev-
el the industry is too close to the policy making
process and that therefore, considering their active
opposition to restrictive policies such as total bans,
the more influence policy makers allow them the
more problematic pushing through a total ban will
be. TheHealth First report does acknowledge that “to
be effective, regulation must be independent of the
alcohol industry”,¹⁰ however this is not currently re-
flected in policy making.
Unlike the tobacco industry, who have been os-
tracised from international tobacco policy making
through Article 5(3) of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC),¹¹ the alcohol industry is
freely allowed to mix with policy makers and is even
actively invited to contribute in regulatory terms to
the control of its own promotional activities.
At EU level this mainly occurs through the EU Al-
cohol and Health Forum, which was set up following
the adoption of the EU Alcohol Strategy¹² and aims
to “support, provide input for and monitor the im-
plementation of the strategy”.¹³ Industry operators
and associations alone comprise over 25 per cent of
the current membership of the Forum, which at the
time of the Forum’s inception led to concerns of “ap-
pearing to sanction industry involvement in EU
Health policy”.¹⁴Six years later, it is evident that fears
that “ineffective approaches favoured by industry
will become de facto EU policy”¹⁵ have now been re-
alised. The publication released¹⁶ detailing the high-
lights of the 4th Open Forum on Alcohol and Health
contains no commitments promoting strategies that
are known to be effective – instead the lead commit-
ment from The Brewers of Europe has “set about en-
suring that fully integrated, consumer-friendly na-
tional self-regulatory systems for beer advertising ex-
ist[ed] across Europe”,¹⁷ the result of which has been
that self-regulation, an approach shown to be inef-
fective at preventing alcohol advertising from reach-
ing or appealing to children,¹⁸ is being pushed to the
vanguard of alcohol advertising control policy. The
fact that the integration of an ineffective strategy
championed by the industry is done under the aus-
pices of the European Union will make it consider-
ably more difficult to initiate a counter-drive for ef-
fective legislative standards.
In the UK as well, the industry is actively relied
upon to play a key role in shaping alcohol policy. The
UKGovernment’s Public Health Responsibility Deal,
launched in July 2010, encourages a new approach
to dealing with alcohol related harm centred around
partnership with the industry, and this forms an in-
tegral part of the Government’s approach to tackling
advertising in its new Alcohol Strategy, published in
March 2012, to which the Health First report cited
above has been a response. It seems that the UKGov-
ernment refuses to acknowledge that bans can be a
proportionate response,¹⁹ and instead of initiating a
much needed overhaul of the current self-regulatory
scheme favours ‘work[ing] with industry and other
relevant bodies to help raise public awareness of the
controls’.²⁰ Involving the industry in thiswaypermits
them to not only repudiate criticisms that the indus-
try facilitates alcohol related harm, but at the same
time to weave low-impact interventions into the fab-
ric of the UK’s alcohol control policy. Thus, the plat-
form given to industry at the heart of the UK’s regu-
latory approach constitutes a substantial blocking
factor on attempts to convince the Government that
10 Health First, supra note 1, at p. 27
11 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 16 June 2003, in
force 27 February 2005, Geneva, available at <http://whqlib-
doc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf> (last accessed
on 6 August 2013)
12 Commission Communication on An EU strategy to support
Member States in reducing alcohol related harm, COM(2006)625
final, at p. 16.
13 Ibid.
14 Nick Sheron, “Alcohol in Europe: the EU Alcohol Forum”, 7 Clin
Med (2007), pp. 323 et sqq, at p. 323.
15 Ibid, at p. 324.
16 European Union, “European Alcohol and Health Forum High-
lights: Open Alcohol and Health Forum 23 November 2012
–Brussels” (2012) available on the Internet at <http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/alcohol_health_forum_high-
lights_en.pdf> ( last accessed on 6 August 2013).
17 Ibid, at p. 21.
18 For an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of self-regula-
tion, see Avalon de Bruijn, Esther van den Wildenberg and Anouk
van den Broeck, Commercial promotion of drinking in Europe:
Key findings of independent monitoring of alcohol marketing in
five European countries (Utrecht: STAP, 2012), available on the
internet at <www.eucam.info/content/bestanden/ammie-eu-
rapport_final.pdf>(last accessed on 6 August 2013).
19 See Home Office, The Government’s Alcohol Strategy (London:
Home Office 2012), at p. 7.
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radical measures such as bans should be pursued in-
stead.
Aside from their direct involvement in the regu-
latory process, the industry have also exploited the
many pressure points that have been established
through the development of a close relationshipwith
policy makers. A specific example of this unprece-
dented access occurred prior to the adoption of the
EU Alcohol Strategy, when the industry managed to
secure an input into the report Alcohol in Eu-
rope²¹which formed the evidence base for the future
Strategy. In a later article, the report’s authors note
that due to formidable industry lobbying before the
publication of the report, “the Commission agreed
to ‘peer-review’ [the] report, unlike for any of their
previous public health reports”,²² and that “astonish-
ingly, the industry was allowed to nominate half of
the scientists invited to the review”.²³ This indicated
that the Commission are not only sensitive to the
pressure exerted by the alcohol industry, but were
moreover willing to accommodate their demands,
raising the question of what else the industry could
achieve.
III. What policy makers must consider in
order to overcome these obstacles
Given that much of the industry’s access to policy
making is attributable to governmental invitation, a
total ban as mooted by the Health First report is on-
ly as far out of reach as policy makers would like it
to be. This sectionwill therefore seek to suggest what
policy makers must start considering if they wish to
reduce industry influence and place themselves in a
stronger position from which a total ban on alcohol
advertising could realistically be enacted.
An effort must primarily be made to reverse the
practice of viewing the industry as a partner in the
fight against alcohol-related harm. So far this out-
look has led at EU level to the fact that the “industry’s
self-regulatory regime is endorsed by the Commis-
sion”²⁴ resulting in an Alcohol Strategy that “bears
the hallmark of a massive compromise between the
health argument and the commercial interests”.²⁵ At
national level, particularly in the UK, it has led to a
blindness to evidence based regulation whereby the
Health Secretary has defended the Responsibility
Deal by declaring that “wewill not treat the food and
drink industry [and by implication the other indus-
tries in the deal including alcohol] as if it was com-
parable to the tobacco industry”,²⁶ completely failing
to recognise that “there is now evidence to show that
the food, drink and alcohol industries use similar tac-
tics and strategies to the tobacco companies to un-
dermine public health interventions”.²⁷ This trust in
the alcohol industry must be tempered, or else we
risk allowing the industry to “establish itself as a
partner to an extent that may be difficult to re-
verse”.²⁸
There has been recent discussion on whether to
move towards the adoption of a Framework Conven-
tion on Alcohol Control, taking a lead from the
FCTC.²⁹One benefit that might arise from such a de-
velopment could be the enactment of a provision
similar to Article 5(3) of the FCTC. This would bar
all policy collaboration with the industry, securing
a reduction in the substantive input of industry op-
erators into alcohol policy making. Taylor and
Dhillon note that “achieving multilateral agreement
is especially challenging in the context of alcohol
due to industry influence”.³⁰ However, as others
rightly point out, “experience with other industries,
especially through tobacco control efforts, can also
teach us a lot about how to critically examine and
resist the alcohol industry’s behavior and prac-
tices”.³¹Consequently, an international commitment
21 Peter Anderson and Ben Baumberg, Alcohol in Europe: A public
health perspective (London: Institute of Alcohol Studies 2006),
available on the internet at http://ec. europa.eu/health-
eu/news_alcoholineurope_en.htm (last accessed on 6 August
2013)
22 Ben Baumberg and Peter Anderson, “The European strategy on
alcohol: A landmark and a lesson”, 42(1) Alcohol and Alcoholism
(2007), pp. 1 et sqq, at p. 1.
23 Ibid, at p. 1.
24 Ibid. at p. 503.
25 Anders Ulstein, “No ordinary partner”, 23(6) Nordic Studies on
Alcohol and Drugs (2006), pp 499 et sqq, at p. 502.
26 See Ian Quinn, “Lansley: ‘Responsibility Deal is achieving big
results’”, The Grocer, 20 April 2012, available on the internet at
<http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/topics/health/lansley-responsibility-
deal-is-achieving-big-results/228388.article> (last accessed on 6
August 2013).
27 Rob Moodie, David Stuckler, Carlos Monteiro et al., “Profits and
pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and
ultra-processed food and drink industries”, 381 Lancet (2013),
pp. 670 et sqq, at p. 672
28 Anders Ulstein, “No ordinary partner”, supra note 24, at p. 503.
29 See for instance: A Taylor and Ibadat Dhillon, “An international
legal strategy for alcohol control: not a framework convention –
at least not yet”, 108 Addiction (2012), pp. 450 et sqq; Robin
Room, “Healthy is as healthy does: where will a voluntary code
get us on international alcohol control?”, 108 Addiction (2013),
pp. 456 et sqq.
30 Allyn Taylor and Ibadat Dhillon, “An international legal strategy
for alcohol control”, supra note 28, at p. 451.
31 Virginia Barbour et al., “Let’s be straight up about the alcohol























































































































to move alcohol policy forward without the input of
the alcohol industry, inspired by the provisions of
the FCTC, is not something that should be shied
away from.
Of course thought must be given to the inevitable
counter argument to an analogy with tobacco poli-
cy, which correctly points out that tobacco and alco-
hol as substances differ fundamentally since tobac-
co is always harmful whatever the dose whereas it
is only excessive consumption of alcohol that is
harmful, with research even suggesting that low lev-
els of alcohol consumption may have beneficial
health effects.³² However, excessive consumption of
alcohol is a greater problem than is generally ac-
knowledged. In the European Union the average
adult consumption of alcohol according toWHO fig-
ures was 12.5 litres of pure alcohol, or 27g (nearly
three drinks) per day, which is more than double the
world average.³³ In manyMember States such as the
UK excessive consumption of alcohol is com-
mon,³⁴ to the extent that the UK Prime Minister ac-
knowledged in the Government’s newAlcohol Strat-
egy that binge drinking accounts for half of all alco-
hol consumed in the UK.³⁵ The levels of excessive al-
cohol consumption that exist lead alcohol to be the
third leading risk factor for disease and mortality in
Europe directly after tobacco and high blood pres-
sure, which therefore indicates that to apply princi-
ples developed in relation to the regulation of tobac-
co to the regulation of alcohol is not disproportion-
ate.
Policy makers must also be careful to prepare for
the inevitable legal challenge to any strong alcohol
policy. Several national alcohol advertising bans
have been disputed directly by the industry in do-
mestic courts, including the French Loi Evin in Bac-
ardi France,³⁶ the Swedish total ban in
Gourmet,³⁷ and the Norwegian total ban in Pedi-
cel.³⁸Furthermore, the challenge to theEU’s total ban
on cigarette advertising³⁹ tells us that EU measures
on alcohol might come under fire as well. The pro-
portionality assessments made by the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union of these bans, which de-
termine whether or not the legislator has gone too
far in promoting public health at the expense of oth-
er interests, have been somewhat erratic. In Tobac-
co Advertising 2,⁴⁰ although the Directive was even-
tually struck down for the reason that some of its
prohibitions on static forms of advertising (i.e. non
cross-border) advertising ‘in noway help to facilitate
trade in the products concerned’⁴¹ and thus did not
meet the conditions of recourse to the chosen legal
basis of Article 114 TFEU because they did not ‘gen-
uinely have as [their] object the improvement of the
conditions for the establishment and functioning of
the internal market’,⁴² the engagement with propor-
tionality in the case was weak, did not sufficiently
engage with the evidence and ‘may cut both
ways’⁴³when relied on in later judgements. Although
this was the first and only time the Court had struck
down a piece of EU legislation, the refusal to discuss
proportionality in any depth may have set the tone
for future assessments of public health legislation.
The Court in Gourmet did not engage with propor-
tionality at all, instead regrettably leaving it to the
national court, which then declared the Swedish ban
disproportionate. However the Court did do so in
Bacardi France, although again not with any level of
detail – it ‘merely observed’⁴⁴ that the French prohi-
bition was appropriate, which led to the French ban
surviving. Given this inconsistent treatment of the
proportionality of bans adopted in the name of pub-
lic health, policy makers must ensure that the evi-
dence supporting suchmeasures is engagedwith ear-
ly on, in order to leave no doubt that advertising bans
are a proportionate response to protect public health.
Themore that is learnt from legal precedent, the bet-
32 See for example: Francois Booyse and Dale Parks, “Moderate
wine and alcohol consumption: Beneficial effects on cardiovascu-
lar disease”, 86(2) Thrombosis and Haemostasis (2001), pp. 509
et sqq.
33 World Health Organisation, Alcohol in the European Union:
Consumption, harm and policy approaches, (Copenhagen: WHO
Regional Office for Europe 2012), at p. 1.
34 D Craig, M Dakkak, I Gilmore et al., “A drunk and disorderly
country: a nationwide cross-sectional survey of alcohol use and
misuse in Great Britain”, 3 Frontline Gastroenterology (2012),
pp. 57 et sqq.
35 The Government’s Alcohol Strategy, supra note 18, at p. 2.
36 Case C-429/02 Bacardi France [2004] ECR I-06613.
37 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet
International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-01795.
38 Case E-4/04 Pedicel AS v Sosial-og helsedirektoratet (Directorate
for Health and Social Affairs) [2005].
39 See Case C376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000]
ECR I-08419.
40 Case 380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-
11573.
41 Case C-376/98 Commission v Parliament and Council (Tobacco
Advertising 1) [2000] ECR I-08419, para 99.
42 Case C-376/98 Commission v Parliament and Council (Tobacco
Advertising 1) [2000] ECR I-08419, para 84.
43 See Amandine Garde, “Freedom of commercial expression and
public health protection: the principle of proportionality as a tool
to strike the balance” in Laurence Gormley and Niamh Nic
Shuibhne (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union – Essays
in Honour of John Usher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),
at p. 122.
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ter the chance policy makers will have of defending
strong policies.
IV. Conclusion
The current EU Alcohol Strategy was due to expire
in 2012, and we are now awaiting a new Strategy
from the Commission. In the meantime, initiatives
such as the Health First report are very welcome,
both at national and EU level. However if we want
to see the Commission and national governments
make the strong commitment to legislation that is
called for by this report, much effort is needed to
persuade them to first cut loose the alcohol industry
who for years have managed to exert considerable
influence at all levels in order to block effective reg-
ulation.
One American judge has summed up the nature
of all dangerous consumption industries in the con-
text of tobacco bluntly but, it is submitted here,
truthfully: “Who are these persons who knowingly
and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk
solely for the purpose ofmaking profits andwho be-
lieve that illness and death of consumers is an ap-
propriate cost of their own prosperity”.⁴⁵ It is not un-
til policy makers realise that there is no reconciling
this identity with effective public health regulation,
and start managing this conflict of interest in the al-
cohol field appropriately, that policies as bold as a
total ban on alcohol advertising can be put into ac-
tion.
Pharmaceuticals
This section updates readers on the latest develop-
ments in pharmaceutical law, giving information on
legislation and case law on various matters (such as
clinical andpre-clinical trials, drug approval andmar-
keting authorisation, the role of regulatory agencies)
and providing analysis on howand towhat extent they
might affect health and security of the individual as
well as in industry.
EU Initiative to Tackle Medication
Errors – Proposals and Challenges
Els Janssens*
Medication errors represent a serious public health
concern. They are reported to be an important cause
of adverse drug reactions adding billions of euros to
healthcare bills around the world.¹ Considering that
a large proportion of medication errors can be pre-
vented efforts should be made to bring down their
incidence. The European Medicines Agency (EMA)
organised a workshop on 28 February and 1 March
2013 to raise awareness around the problem of med-
ication errors and to formulate proposals to improve
reporting and prevention of medication errors
through collaboration between the European Com-
mission, the EMA and the national authorities for
drug and patient safety. A final report of this work-
shop is available on the Agency’s website².
Medication errors are generally understood as any
mistakes in the prescribing, supplying, dispensing,
preparing, administering ormonitoring ofmedicinal
products. A classic example of a medication error is
a drug overdose but situations where a wrong med-
icine or a wrong formulation of a medicine is given
to a patient also classify as medication errors. A legal
definition does not exist. Instead, multiple defini-
tions and terms have been commanded over the past
years subject to individual researcher’s preference.
This may explain the variation in prevalence of med-
ication errors³ but at the same time underlines the
need for agreement on a definition and classification
of errors because the incidence of medication errors
of different classes are different as are the potential
remedies.⁴ In other words harmonisation of termi-
nology is key for any improvement strategies aimed
at tackling medication errors.
Supported by legislative initiatives medication er-
rors are increasingly monitored through drug safety
systems. The recent review of the European pharma-
covigilance legislation has indeed broadened the de-
45 Opinion of Judge H Lee Sarokin, Haynes v Liggett Group Inc. 140
F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992), at p. 683.
* European Medicines Agency. Any views expressed in the report
are the personal views of the author and do not represent a
position of the European Medicines Agency.
1 EMA press release of 1 march 2013 (EMA/130601/2013).
2 EMA medication errors workshop report -<http://www.ema.eu-
ropa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Re-
port/2013/05/WC500143163.pdf>.
3 M. Lisby, L.P. Nielsen, B. Brock and J. Mainz, “How are medica-
tion errors defined? A systematic literature review of definitions
and characteristics”, 22(6) International Journal for quality in
healthcare (2010), pp. 507–518 (Advance Access Publication: 17
October 2010), as quoted by Jeffrey Aronson and Robin Ferner in
their presentation “Do we have a common understanding of
medication errors?” during EMA workshop on medication errors
on 28 February 2013.
4 R. Ferner and J. Aronson, “Clarification of terminology in medica-
tion errors – Definitions and classification”, 29(11) Drug Safety
(2006), 1011–1022.
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